Yesterday we posted an AP article about the May 12 hearings by the US Senate Policy Committee on Corruption in Iraq featuring three new speakers. Below is the URL for the DPC webpage with the transcripts, but we copied them below for the record in case they remove the data later.
What is interesting is that this set of testimonies resulted in an AP article which popped up all over the world, including Europe and Asia. The prior month's testimonies on KBR didn't show up anywhere in Google news searches.
The best interviews are the first two, Judge Brennan, and James Mattil. The second interviewee, James Mattil, has many good details which I agree with - I had the same experiences in the prior year, 2005. Mattil was briefly interviewed in a recent 60 Minutes update on Iraq Corruption which I discussed in an earlier post. His interview statement below is much more detailed and quite interesting on the events in later 2006 after I had left Iraq in March, 2006.
vj
Here is a picture of the Embassy Baghdad Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG) in March, 2006, just before I left Iraq. Mattil talks about the ACWG inactions later in 2006, just like I encountered.
View this photo
=======================================================
from:
Senate DPC Transcripts on Iraq Corruption
Here is the agenda and outline of speakers, and a statement from the Chairman, Senator Dorgan, followed by transcripts of three testimonies:
Monday, May 12, 2008
2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.
406 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Have Bush Administration Reconstruction and Anti-Corruption Failures Undermined the U.S. Mission in Iraq?
Opening Statements
Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Chairman, Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Senator Amy Klobuchar
Senator Claire McCaskill
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
Witnesses
Judge Arthur Brennan
Former State Department Official
James Mattil
Former State Department Official
Major General William Nash (Ret.)
========================================================
Opening Statement
Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Chairman, Democratic Policy Committee
“ Have Bush Administration Reconstruction and Anti-Corruption Failures
Undermined the U.S. Mission in Iraq?”
Monday, May 12, 2008
406 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Today the Democratic Policy Committee is holding the fourteenth in a series of
oversight hearings to examine contracting fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq.
We will be hearing from two former Administration officials who travelled to Iraq
with a noble purpose: to help Iraqi anti-corruption investigators in their efforts to
crack down on fraud, waste, and abuse, as part of the State Department’s Office of
Accountability and Transparency.
These witnesses have approached the Committee with a very disturbing account.
They have told us that the Bush Administration essentially blocked their efforts to
help the Iraqi anti-corruption effort, and contributed to the culture of corruption.
The witnesses will describe their work with a very courageous Iraqi judge, who I had an
opportunity to hear at a hearing in March.
Judge Radhi al Radhi was the head of the Commission of Public Integrity, which was
established by the Coalition Provisional Authority after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
By all accounts, Judge Radhi was an Iraqi patriot. He had been imprisoned and
tortured by Saddam Hussein’s regime. When he became the head of the
Commission of Public Integrity, Judge Radhi took his job very much to heart,
because he knew that his country’s future depended largely on the ability to
establish an honest, transparent government.
When he testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee in March, Judge
Radhi estimated that corruption had resulted in the loss of $18 billion in
government funds, and most of those funds had been U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Judge Radhi said that instead of supporting his efforts to fight corruption, the top
levels of the Iraqi government had ultimately suppressed his investigations.
Some have described Judge Radhi as an Iraqi version of Elliott Ness, who became
legendary for fighting organized crime in Chicago. Many will recall the movie
“The Untouchables”, which dramatized that story. Sadly, it turned out that Judge Radhi was
not untouchable. This is a picture of Judge Radhi’s house after it was hit by rockets,
fired in apparent retaliation for Judge Radhi’s investigations.
Judge Radhi also testified that since the establishment of the Commission of Public
Integrity, more than 31 employees have been assassinated as well as at least an
additional 12 family members.
In a number of cases, Judge Radhi’s staff and their relatives were kidnapped or
detained and tortured prior to being killed. Judge Radhi himself was fired upon by
snipers, but was able to escape.
One would have expected that our own government would have been doing
everything it could to support Judge Radhi’s anti-corruption efforts. But as we
will hear from our first two witnesses today, that was simply not the case. On the
contrary, our own government contributed to the culture of corruption.
Judge Arthur Brennan served in Iraq in 2007 as the Director of the Department
of State’s Office of Accountability and Transparency. I should note that Judge
Brennan is a Republican, and became Director of OAT after serving as a New
Hampshire Superior Court judge for 15 years.
James Mattil served as the Chief of Staff at the Office of Accountability and
Transparency in Iraq for two years. In that capacity, he served as an advisor to
Judge Radhi in his efforts to investigate corruption in the government of Iraq.
Our third witness will discuss the manner in which U.S. efforts to build up the
government of Iraq should have been carried out. Major General William Nash
(ret.) has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations, both as a U.S. Army
commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina and as a civilian administrator for the United
Nations in Kosovo.
Let me close by saying that by law, the Democratic and Republican Policy
Committees in the Senate, which were established in 1947, are authorized to hold
hearings and obtain witness testimony. In the 109th Congress, we made use of
that authority to conduct a series of hearings on Iraq contracting abuses.
In the 110th Congress, there has been some increase in oversight on the issue of
Iraq contracting abuses. However, the fact is that the scope of the abuses is so
huge, and the standing Senate Committees have so many other pressing issues
within their jurisdiction, that the issue of Iraq contracting abuses is still not getting
the degree of oversight that it deserves.
I thank our witnesses for appearing today, and look forward to their testimony.
-- END --
==============================================================
Testimony of Judge Arthur Brennan
Former State Department Official
Good morning Committee members. My name is Arthur Brennan. I am a New
Hampshire Superior Court Justice with senior status. I retired as a full time judge on
June 1, 2007. In early July of 2007, I took the position of Director of the Office of
Accountability and Transparency (OAT) at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
I am a U.S. Army veteran of the 82d Airborne Division and I served for 20 years
in the U.S. Army Reserves. I worked for years as a contractor doing stone work and tree
work in New Hampshire. Later, I went to law school on the GI Bill.
My wife of 40 years, Nancy Brennan, a retired teacher, also intended to work in
Iraq. In 1995, Nancy and I worked together assisting in an effort to establish a legitimate
court system in Cambodia. On July 23, 2007, after I had been in Baghdad for only a few
weeks, Nancy was diagnosed with an incurable form of cancer. I took emergency leave
from Baghdad, and because of Nancy’s health, I resigned from my job as director of
OAT.
In January of 2007, when a State Department official contacted me about taking
the job as director of OAT, I was told that one of the U.S. Embassy’s most important
objectives was to reduce the devastating corruption that was destroying Iraq and
lengthening this crisis. Corruption in the Iraqi government was robbing the Iraqi people
of their right to law and order as well as their access to health care and basic services,
such as electricity, water, and transportation.
The OAT team, each member having had years of experience in Iraq, soon
discovered that the Department of State’s actual policies not only contradicted the
anticorruption mission but indirectly contributed to and has allowed corruption to fester
at the highest levels of the Iraqi Government. The Embassy effort against corruption,
including its new centerpiece, the now defunct Office of Accountability and
Transparency (OAT), was little more than “window dressing.“ OAT’s work and the
work of its close partners, the Department of Justice’s International Criminal
Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), and the Iraqi Commission for
Public Integrity (CPI), under the leadership of Judge Radhi Hamza al Radhi, was ignored
and demeaned by the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the
Government of Iraq.
This is because the actual policies and performance of the State Department in
Iraq were not what they are represented to be. The Department of State has negligently,
recklessly and sometimes intentionally misled the U.S. Congress, the American people,
and the people of Iraq. In a sense, the Department of State has contributed to the killing
and maiming of U.S. soldiers; the deaths of thousands of Iraqi civilians; the bolstering of
illegal militias, insurgents and al Qaeda--and the enrichment and empowerment of the
thieves controlling some of the Iraqi ministries. Further, the Department of State’s
performance or nonperformance has discouraged honest men and women in the Iraqi
government. Billions of U.S. and Iraqi dollars have been lost, stolen and wasted. It is
likely that some of that money is financing outlaws and insurgents such as the Mehdi
Army. I will give you a few examples that substantiate these conclusions.
In mid-July 2007, OAT received a request from the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to comment on a draft of SIGIR’s upcoming report on U.S.
anticorruption efforts in Iraq. The draft report described the positive development of an
entity named the Joint Anti-Corruption Committee (JACC), which consists of the three
Iraqi government watchdogs, the BSA (similar to GAO), the CPI (similar to FBI), and the
Iraqi IG’s.
In OAT's response to the SIGIR request for comment, we pointed out to SIGIR,
among other things, that the only visible activity of the Joint Anticorruption Committee
(JACC) was to provide a forum for an Iraqi official who wanted Judge Radhi Hamza al
Radhi, Director of the CPI, to be removed from his position as Commissioner of CPI.
This official sought Judge Radhi's removal because CPI’s investigators were uncovering
billions of dollars of corruption in the ministries and this was causing political problems
for certain Iraqi leaders with close ties to the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki.
Unaware that the response to the SIGIR inquiry had to be vetted by the Chief of
Mission, I ordered that the answer be sent directly to SIGIR. Within a day, the answer
was withdrawn and a new response, drafted outside of OAT, was sent back to SIGIR. It
bore little or no resemblance to the OAT response and failed to even mention what a
disaster the JACC really was. I have copies of both letters. Incidentally, I approved the
new letter, but much against my better judgment. Later events make me regret that
moment when I dropped my principles and drifted along with the program.
Later in July, the OAT team expressed concerns to the Chief of Mission,
Ambassador Crocker, about an Iraqi leader who was being investigated for theft and or
misappropriation of up to one billion dollars in medical supplies intended for the use of
the Iraqi people. The medical supplies were showing up on the black market in Iraq and
Syria. This leader insisted on accompanying the OAT Senior Advisor assigned to his
agency whenever the advisor met other Iraqi officials employed in other Iraqi ministries.
OAT had evidence that the man was corrupt and dangerous. He had been in the
leadership of a ministry that was directly involved in the abduction, torture and murder of
hundreds of Sunnis who had sought treatment in Iraqi medical centers. The death squads
within the medical centers hunted down Sunnis who had given their names and addresses
when admitted for medical care.
We pointed out to Ambassador Crocker that we were concerned about going
along with this leader because in doing so we were lending our credibility to a person
with a reputation for dishonesty and violence (the man had threatened CPI investigators).
I told Crocker that I felt we were bolstering the man’s visibility and position in the Iraqi
government at the expense of our credibility. Further, we felt we were endangering the
life of the OAT Senior Advisor assigned to his agency for nothing. Ambassador Crocker
responded that he wanted more proof. I referred him to the OAT Senior Advisor to CPI
who then explained to the Chief of Mission in more detail. Ambassador Crocker
immediately ordered a comprehensive report on Embassy anticorruption efforts. I took
emergency leave shortly thereafter and I am unaware of whether or not any such report
was ever issued.
That Iraqi leader is still in power. In fact, a few months later, the leader
recognized one of the OAT team members and commented that he looked forward to the
day when Judge Radhi would be sent back to Iraq where “justice would be done.”
In January and July of 2007, OAT issued a comprehensive report of its own on
the level of corruption in the 31 Iraqi ministries. This 60 page report, by the way, has
nothing to do with the report requested by Ambassador Crocker. To my knowledge, the
State Department has never reacted or responded to OAT's intial January report or the
updated July report in any way.
In the late summer or early fall of 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform requested a copy of the OAT July report. The Department of State
retroactively classified the report to to prevent it from being made a subject of public
knowledge and discussion. Also, after the inquiry by the House Oversight Committee,
OAT personnel and all other State Department personnel were ordered not to testify at all
to the House Committee about corruption within the Iraqi Government.
Later, when an investigator from the House Oversight Committee was in Baghdad
and asked to speak with members of OAT, he was told by Department of State
representatives that OAT was “too busy.” In actuality, members of the OAT team,
having little to do after Judge Radhi’s departure and the Prime Minister's subsequent
evisceration of CPI, were watching western movies at the Embassy, in the OAT office,
at my desk and on my computer.
OAT Senior Advisors worked very closely with Judge Radhi Hamza al Radhi, the
Commissioner of CPI, the Iraqi equivalent to the FBI. Judge Radhi has a solid reputation
in the U.S. Embassy and the Department of Justice for running an honest, unbiased, and
independent government agency.
Judge Radhi’s CPI investigators were trained and advised by the American law
enforcement officers of ICITAP. Those law enforcement officers hold Judge Radhi and
his CPI investigators in high esteem. I have personal knowledge that those American law
enforcement officers would as quickly risk their lives for those Iraqi men as they would
for each other.
Despite orders from the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office to remove Sunnis from CPI
employment; to fire his Chief Investigator, known as the “Elliott Ness of Iraq;” and not to
investigate high ranking Iraqi officials without permission from the Prime Minister;
Judge Radhi courageously stuck to his principles and refused to carry out those illegal
orders. Judge Radhi and his best officers from CPI, and their families, have paid a heavy
price for their steadfast loyalty to the rule of law and the Iraqi people. 31 CPI employees
have been murdered along with 12 of their family members. Now, Judge Radhi and his
best lieutenants are men without a country.
In September of 2007, Judge Radhi was forced to seek asylum in the United
States. Finally, after continuous political efforts by the Iraqi prime minister’s office to
remove Judge Radhi had failed; after bogus attempts to accuse him of crimes and
corruption had failed; and after threats and murder of CPI personnel and their families
had failed; the two rockets that narrowly missed his house in Baghdad convinced him that
his family would be murdered and that he must resign and seek asylum in the United
States.
In the end, the State Department abandoned and betrayed Judge Radhi. The State
Department’s response to this tragedy is telling--the American law enforcement officers
of ICITAP and the senior advisors at OAT who worked so closely with CPI and sought
protection for Judge Radhi and his investigators were ordered not to provide letters or
affidavits in support of Judge Radhi's applications for asylum. Who knew more about
Judge Radhi and his deputies than the officers of ICITAP? Who could better explain to
the administrative judge what danger Judge Radhi was in and why he should be granted
asylum? What clearer message could the State Department be sending to any honest
Iraqi official about the credibility, loyalty and reliability of the U.S. government? What
clearer message could the State Department be sending to the corrupt Iraqi officials who
threatened to harm and may have attempted to kill Judge Radhi and his family? What an
affront to the American law enforcement officers of ICITAP who had so effectively and
courageously worked with Judge Radhi and his investigators.
There were are a number of problems with oversight that should be considered.
For instance, the Bureau of Supreme Audit (BSA), similar to our GAO, is one of the
three Iraqi watchdog agencies assisted by OAT and now ACCO, but to my knowledge,
no one in the State Department has ever seen an actual audit of any Iraqi agency or
ministry.
Also, the CPI and the other watchdog agencies are very limited in their ability to
audit, inspect and investigate. Many of the Ministries are controlled by criminals and
guarded by armed thugs. It would be a death sentence to try to do an investigation
without armed support and security.
Shortly after I arrived in Iraq, a senior U.S. Army JAG officer stopped me after a
meeting. He told me "Judge, be careful. Your job is dangerous and not only from the
Iraqis. There are people here who would be happy to see this thing last forever.” At the
time, I thought it was a strange thing to say. Now, I find it reasonable and
understandable.
Thank you for listening to me. I’ll do my best to accurately answer any questions
you may have.
==================================================
Statement by James F. Mattil
Former State Department Official
Introduction
My name is James F. Mattil. I was employed by the U.S. Department of State as Chief of
Staff for the Office of Accountability and Transparency (OAT) at the U.S. Embassy Baghdad,
from October 2006 through October 2007. I welcome your invitation to testify today, but am
distressed that it is necessary.
During my tour in Iraq, my duties included serving as acting senior consultant to the Iraqi
Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), as acting senior consultant to the Iraqi Inspectors General
and as liaison between OAT and the intelligence community.
This was my second tour in Iraq. I previously worked for a Department of State
contractor as Program Manager for the Iraqi Business Centers and in information operations with
MNC-I. My career background is in the private sector, where I founded two manufacturing
firms and two non-profit organizations.
Background
The Office of Accountability & Transparency (OAT) was set-up to provide assistance,
training and support to Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies, the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), the
Iraqi Inspectors General (IIG) and the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI).
In the 11 months that I served in Iraq, OAT was under-staffed for its mission and has had
NO operating budget. In fact, the proposed staffing of OAT was cut from 25 staff to 6 without
knowledge or input from OAT staff, or any other known oversight. There was no transparency
even with the office of transparency.
Our job was to implement U.S. policy, but whenever we tried, our own officials blocked
us. In the OAT Baseline Report you can read the official embassy anticorruption strategy.
Overview
Although fighting corruption is often cited as one of our “highest priorities,” it was not
even one of 18 Iraqi benchmarks associated with “the Surge.” Corruption and its consequences
are the fuel that sustains the insurgency, providing the money, the people and the motivation to
fight Americans in Iraq.
Stuart Bowen of SIGIR correctly calls it “the second insurgency.”
Hence, it’s only reasonable to ask why fighting corruption is not a higher priority in Iraq
and why the United States government has not provided more resources and political support.
In retrospect, it seems reasonable to conclude that the reasons are either: gross
incompetence, willful negligence or political intent on the part of the Bush administration and
more specifically the Department of State.
Since we have done so little, it’s easy to see why the government of Iraq has not done
more; we have demanded no better.
Without a vision and sincere commitment to building a new Iraq, and without hope and
dedication, the alternative is for Iraqi leaders to plunder Iraq for short-term financial gain. That’s
what’s happening. That’s also what Iraqi citizens see to be happening. That’s why so few Iraqis
support the US mission. And that’s why so many Iraqis are willing to fight America.
Equally disturbing is that in the hands of criminals CPI can be a vicious tool to persecute
political enemies and protect political cronies. And this is why the Prime Minister’s office
waged an unrelenting 10-month campaign against Judge Radhi – to gain control of CPI. But
why has the US allowed this to happen and have we been complicit?
To date, CPI has been nominally effective, but it could be considerably more effective
almost immediately – all that’s needed is the forthright and dedicated political will by the Prime
Minister and honest servants within the government of Iraq. Without the political will fighting
corruption within the government of Iraq is fruitless.
• We have not demanded transparency or accountability from the government of Iraq.
• We have not demanded that the government of Iraq comply with Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) orders, the Iraqi constitution or the rule of law.
• We have remained silent in the face of an unrelenting campaign to subvert the
independence of CPI.
• We have ignored the consequences of “secret orders” issued to CPI by the Prime
Minister’s Office that grant Iraqi officials a license to steal.
• We allowed ourselves to be bullied and excluded from the Joint Anti-Corruption
Committee (JACC), a bilateral council, by the Prime Minister’s so-called anti-corruption
czar, the IG at the Ministry of Health, a man associated with the Mahdi militias.
• We witnessed a campaign of threats and intimidation that has driven CPI’s leaders to
seek refuge in safe houses and forced them to seek political asylum in America. Think
about this! Those who attempt to enforce the rule of law have become the victims, not
the protectors. And we did nothing.
• And we have watched as America’s troops die and suffer in an effort to support a
government that appears unwilling to help itself.
OAT advisors were acutely aware and seriously concerned by an unrelenting campaign
by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office to undermine the independence of CPI, seize control over
CPI and to interfere with investigations of corruption within the government of Iraq. OAT has
passed this information up the chain of command and briefed Ambassadors Saloom and Crocker
about the problems, to no avail. We expected that America’s diplomats would demand good
governance in exchange for American support; apparently this has not happened.
Iraqi Political Will
During recent testimony to Congress Ambassador Crocker was quoted as saying, “I do
believe Iraq’s leaders have the will to tackle the country’s pressing problems, although it will
take longer than we initially anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the
issue.”
Based on my experience in Iraq and my direct contact with CPI over the past eleven
months, I must respectfully disagree with Ambassador Crocker’s conclusion that Iraq’s leaders
have the will to tackle the country’s pressing problems. I’ll explain:
Iraq’s endemic corruption is an integral element of the insurgency, providing money,
personnel and motivation to insurgents and terrorists.
The Iraqi Prime Minister has repeatedly pledged to enact reforms to fight corruption as
part of the International Compact with Iraq. But his deeds do not match his promises.
• Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki and his proxies have expended enormous time and energy
fighting Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies, not corruption.
• The Prime Minister’s office has ignored the Iraqi constitution and thrown it into the
Tigris River, as they have attempted to seize control over CPI’s internal operations,
replacing staff and withholding funds.
• Most notably, the Prime Minister issued “secret orders” to CPI, prohibiting that agency
from referring cases to the courts if the cases involve former or current high-ranking Iraqi
government officials, including the Prime Minister. This order interferes with
investigations of graft and corruption involving U.S. funds, Development Fund for Iraq
(DFI) funds entrusted to the U.S. government, as well as Iraqi funds. The secret order is,
literally, a license to steal.
• The Prime Minister has issued additional secret orders demanding that the DG of
investigations be replaced.
• After Judge Radhi resigned, the Prime Minister appointed a new acting CPI
commissioner, Moussa Faraj, who three weeks earlier had been arrested and jailed on
corruption charges. Faraj was out on bail and had yet to appear in court when he was
appointed commissioner of Iraq’s lead anti-corruption agency.
The US Embassy Baghdad has been briefed on all of the information in this statement. In
addition, classified intelligence reports document even more troubling information that amplifies
the information in this statement. Our leaders have remained silent, giving tacit approval to
corruption.
Problems & Issues
Our job was to implement U.S. policy; however there appeared to be two policies – Plan
A (written) and Plan B (unwritten). In retrospect, it seems that policy was often overruled or
guided by an invisible voice somewhere up the chain of command – a voice without a
conscience.
U.S. or Iraqi Funds – Given the lack of transparency and accountability within the
government of Iraq, it’s virtually impossible to track money. Iraqi government computers at the
Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) were stolen; the Central Bank of Iraq caught fire – twice.
Neither CPI nor U.S. government agencies have legitimate access to track money. But does it
really matter? Every U.S. dollar provided frees up 1,400 Iraqi dinars for theft, waste and abuse.
Gun Control – One of the few assets OAT might have been able to provide were
weapons for CPI investigators to help empower and protect them so they could function and
survive. After purchasing weapons for CPI, OAT was unable to get State Department legal
department approval to release some 500 Glocks and 100 shotguns to CPI. When Judge Radhi
defected and Faraj was illegally appointed CPI commissioner, U.S. government personnel were
no longer allowed to enter “the zoo,” which had fallen under control by elements of the Mahdi
militia. In effect, these weapons were in enemy hands, beyond U.S. control and “inside” the
International Zone (IZ).
SIGIR vs. CPI - An OAT report concluded that Iraq is incapable of even rudimentary law
enforcement. Yet, CPI has brought more cases to court than SIGIR, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction – despite the security situation. The fact is, SIGIR needs CPI to
investigate the Iraqi side of joint corruption, so without cooperation and assistance from CPI, the
U.S. government will have incredible difficulty bringing war profiteers to justice. Yet some of
Iraq’s top investigators languish in Virginia, undocumented and unemployed.
Government of Iraq Organization Charts – One of my first attempted projects was to
create an organization chart of the Iraqi government with cooperation from the intelligence
community. The charts would identify names, positions, sects, and political, tribal affiliations.
These linkages would help identify the sources and methods of corruption within the government
of Iraq. I was surprised that such information didn’t already exist and was even more surprised
when I was told that U.S. Embassy officials objected to having such a chart and would not
provide necessary information.
OAT Strategic Plan – In late December 2006, I prepared a strategic plan for OAT based
on a series of laws, CPA orders and official U.S. policy statements. The acting director of OAT
ignored this document and proceeded to act on his own agenda or an agenda dictated by some
invisible hand. The OAT staff was cut and funding for projects was never budgeted or allocated.
When embassy officials requested the strategic plan, I was told it should not be given to them,
even though these were the people to whom we reported.
Midnight Taskings – On several occasions, OAT received taskings from the White
House, the National Security Council and the State Department. Typically, these taskers asked
for suggestions on how to fight corruption, “if” we were given a free hand. Responses were
prepared by staff from OAT and the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance
Program (ICITAP), which included former FBI agents and other senior U.S. police advisors who
had served in Bosnia and Kosovo. None of the suggestions were ever implemented and one
funded program to change a kitten into a tiger was killed.
The Pet Iraqi Syndrome – U.S. officials who work closely with Iraqi counterparts are
prone to adopt their Iraqi counterpart as the one loyal and honest official, especially when they
speak English. These Iraqis often cited fear of CPI prosecutions for failure to execute their
budgets. This is a red herring. No one can be tried without approval of the relevant minister due
to Article 136(b). The U.S. embassy strategy states that repealing this law is a top priority, yet it
remains on the books. Meanwhile State Department officials actively defend 136(b), claiming
that it prevents abuse by CPI and that ministers can’t really use this law without political
blowback. This almost sounds plausible, except that invoking 136(b) is done in secret so the
public never knows if or when it has been used.
Along these same lines, the embassy economics advisor relied on his pet Iraqis to lead
him to conclude, as he told me and Chris Griffith, “we want to see Judge Radhi out.”
Apparently, this became yet another element of the unpublished embassy anticorruption strategy.
The Infamous Report – In response to constant accusations of sectarian prosecution and
abuse, the senior consultant to CPI, Vincent Foulk, tasked staff to conduct a data analysis and
report on CPI anticorruption efforts. The report found that prosecutions were not based on
sectarian criteria and generally complied with the government of Iraq’s demographic breakdown.
However, the report was also seen as an embarrassment to U.S. efforts and was retroactively
declared “classified” nine months after it was released, when U.S. media finally discovered it,
when it was already in the hands of Congress and on the Internet.
OAT Boycotts ACWG – In July 2006, after the transition from the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO) to the Iraq Transition Office (ITAO), an internal power struggle
emerged between the U.S. Departments of State and Justice. OAT personnel were directed to
boycott the weekly Anticorruption Working Group (ACWG) meeting, even though OAT was the
only office that regularly provided information at this so-called, mission-wide coordinating
meeting.
Iraqi Refugees and Political Asylum - I must add that the U.S. response to Judge Radhi’s
departure from CPI is personally disturbing to me and others. It has been a shameful national
disgrace.
Judge Radhi’s daughter and son were accepted to study at George Mason University in
2005, but have been denied student visas by the State Department. Repeated requests for help by
officials at the Departments of State and Defense were ignored.
After Judge Radhi and his associates applied for political asylum, the State Department
provided no assistance or support to 24 Iraqi men, women and children in dire need. Worse yet,
State directed all OAT employees to avoid any contact with these Iraqis. State issued a memo
prohibiting embassy staff from writing reference letters on behalf of these Iraqis. I confess; I
disobeyed these orders and brought food and clothing, took the families to doctors and bought
medicine for their children. I solicited help from dozens of NGOs, refugee assistance groups and
churches. I found that no federal or state government agency and none of America’s faith-based
initiatives are authorized to provide aid. The first source of substantial financial aid was Judge
Brennan. Fortunately, the Quakers have also helped, providing endless hours and supplies. We
owe them a debt of gratitude.
The U.S. government has done nothing, nothing but delay and obstruct the immigration
process. This travesty has continued for 10 months, and there is no end in sight. Judge Radhi’s
son remains a stateless person stuck in England, despite assurances from U.S. officials to Rep.
Waxman’s committee that this would be one of their top priorities.
State may claim that their purpose is to avoid accusations that the U.S. is taking sides in
internal Iraqi affairs. However, by abandoning loyal and dedicated Iraqi law enforcement
officials, while ignoring the transgressions of Prime Minister Al-Maliki, the U.S. is taking sides
– arguably, the wrong side.
Judge Radhi and his associates, Mr. Salam, Mr. Amer, and military translators Mr.
Atheer and Mr. Latif have earned and deserve America’s support. Instead, they have all been
abandoned. If we refuse to stand by those who stand by us, we undermine all future efforts to
build coalitions and win friends and allies.
Postscript:
Despite the obstacles and failures outlined herein, the OAT office received the
Department of State’s “Meritorious Achievement Award.” In December 2007 OAT was
dismantled.
=====================================================
This testimony is not related to corruption, but the third testifier, MG William Nash, talks about the proposed new agency that would have a "ready reserve" of civilians for any conflict area. Kinda like an IRMO in reserve (rather than let State or USAID lead reconstruction efforts in the future).
Statement of William L. Nash
Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to this
hearing. I am honored, and hope my participation will be useful to your work.
Along with this statement, I ask that the full text of the U.S. Post-Conflict
Capabilities Independent Task Force report, In the Wake of War, be entered into the
record, and would like to note that the report is available at the Council on Foreign
Relations’s website, www.cfr.org. Some may say this report from July, 2005 is dated; I
would argue it was prescient, and until the recommendations from the report are
implemented, the United States will continue to face the issues of incompetence and
negligence you are discussing today.
There are three points that I would make: first, the importance of recognizing
stabilization and construction operations as critical national security priorities; second,
the need for leadership within the U.S. government for building and coordinating U.S.
post-conflict capabilities; third, the importance of fully funding our nation-building
capacities.
I will start by emphasizing that stabilization and reconstruction operations are
critical national security priorities. Dozens of countries are on the brink of collapse.
These failing and failed states create vacuums of power that are often filled by terrorism,
crime, civil conflict, corruption, and trafficking—all issues which affect the United
States’s national security or our conscience. We must accept that these failed states are
national security priorities and build our capabilities, both military and civilian, to
conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations. This requires acknowledging that
war-fighting has two dimensions: winning wars and winning the peace. Iraq has clearly
shown us what a lack of planning, leadership, accountability, and wisdom will cost our
nation.
Leadership is, in fact, the most important factor. Improved responsiveness to
post-conflict challenges cannot be accomplished without high-level attention and support
in the U.S. executive and legislative branches. Throughout the 1990s, including my time
in the Balkans, the U.S. government began to understand the complex nature of post-war
operations and codified lessons learned, as well as improved planning for subsequent
operations. In more recent times, this learning was disregarded, with devastating
consequences in Iraq. A comprehensive and thoroughly vetted plan with sufficient forces
allocated to public security, and provisions to provide basic public services and establish
the foundation for future political and economic development should have been part of
the war plan.
Instead, the government’s plan was ad hoc and incomplete without clear
responsibilities established. It was without vision or wisdom. Importantly, the
government failed to recognize that whether post-conflict efforts are done by government
employees (civil or military) or contracted to private companies, all work must be part of
a single, integrated plan for which responsibility and accountability are clear.
Only now are we beginning to return to the learning curve begun in the 1990s.
And I should note that all of this is really more than “post-conflict reconstruction” – the
leadership and capacities and resources of which I speak are equally applicable to “preconflict
construction” – that is conflict prevention, an important element of any U.S.
foreign policy approach.
My third point then is the importance of fully funding the budget requests related
to these capabilities. If we are to get our house in order, authorizations and
appropriations for defense, state, and foreign operations for FY 2008 and 2009 must
reflect the right priorities. This Committee can and should have great influence on
meeting our needs. Specifically, the FY 08 Emergency Supplemental should include no
less than $106 million dollars to fund the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS) and an active and standby response corps. Further, the
Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act (H.R. 1084) that authorizes
S/CRS and the civilian reserve corps has passed the House and is awaiting action in the
Senate. I understand that the Senate version of the bill, S. 613, is being held up by one
Senator. I urge you to take a leadership role and push the authorizing bill through the
Senate. To criticize the Executive branch without taking appropriate legislative action
does not serve the nation.
The final point I want to share with you is a personal note, I want to emphasize to
this committee that the civilian implementation parts of stabilization missions are the
most complex and the most difficult. As one of the few Americans who has been a leader
in both military and civilian peacekeeping missions, I can tell you without reservation,
that the civilian half needs far more study, leadership, resources, and prioritization. To
bring the political, economic, social and security issues together in a comprehensive and
coherent program in a foreign land under harsh and dangerous conditions is hard, very
hard. Therefore, it is important for all members of this Committee to work collectively
with their counterparts in the Senate and the House, especially the authorizations and
appropriations committees, because the scope of these issues is much larger than the
Defense or State Departments. Our government is not properly organized, resourced or
led to meet the challenges we face.
Again, I thank the Committee for giving me an opportunity to speak with you
today and, more particularly, for your interest in improving our nation’s ability to address
one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. I again refer members of the
Committee and others to the In the Wake of War report, which assesses the progress of
the United States in developing a civilian and military capacity to meet the complex
demands of stabilization and reconstruction operations and makes concrete
recommendations for improving the U.S. government’s ability to plan, coordinate, and
execute these operations. I look forward to your questions, and I will be happy to provide
my views on the specific reconstruction failures raised by the earlier speakers.
- end -
