American Consultant fails to produce expected work in Iraq Contract
What is interesting about this article below is that it talks about a consulting firm that was founded by Robert Raggio in Baghdad and got a contract to develop a data base that tracked what happened to $7.3 billion in "Iraqi money" spent by the coalition. I worked with Robert Raggio in my first year in Baghdad. He was one of the other consultants helping set up the Iraqi anti-corruption agency CPI , and was a real character. The 7.3 billion dollars talked about was Iraqi money seized by the coalition after the initial invasion in 2003, then spent by the coalition on Iraqi reconstruction activities without decent accounting. Raggio founded his firm after working at CPI, the Iraqi anti-corruption agency, for perhaps 15 months. He had hired perhaps 40 Iraqi locals to do a lot of the work, and I knew some of them because they were hired from CPI. The records he had to deal with were a MESS because as other audits have indicated, no one really spent much time trying to account for the usage of the Iraqi funds. I can say clearly that there were hordes of attorneys, health specialists, etc. but NO ONE form the federal government sent enough accountants or auditors in 2003 to ensure the captured funds were clearly controlled. I had earlier spent time to find why no one from GAO, OMB or even military accounting groups did not come to Iraq, and it is because they DO NOT have any unit dedicated to working overseas. Any overseas work done by US agencies is through the State Dept., and the State Dept. does not have people at that level, or experienced in disbursement controls or project management. Consider that several large contracting firms were hired to do engineering and construction, telecommunications, etc. but none of the big 4 accounting firms were hired to ensure captured funds were controlled (since the GAO, etc did not assign people to Iraq).
I had a friend who worked with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (the state police) and they had $5-million in cash of the captured funds sitting in a vault, and were using it to pay the gardener $100,000 or more per month for the fancy building complex used by that Ministry in the Green Zone. The state dept. took over responsibility for the Interior Ministry in 2004 or early 2005 and appointed an ex ambassador to run it who had NO skills and was too old too be taken seriously. He ordered the funds be "returned" and they disappeared for maybe a year until another friend was trying to resolve a problem with all the unpaid bills to the gardener and finally found the funds which had been moved to another room in storage. That is the kind of thing that happened in 2003-2005.
As for Raggio, he probably was the only bidder, he was already in Iraq, and knew everyone in the relevant departments, and had good contacts to get Iraqi workers to do the work, since some of the records were in Arabic. It does not surprise me it took as long as it did to get the final requirement. I remember his main contact was a Navy officer who was a Comptroller and I met them occasionally in the dining room, and he was very good. Then he left and maybe the new program manager added the new requirement. Raggio was quite catankerous, but honest, so I doubt he did anything wrong.
vj
==========================================
By Matt Kelley
USA TODAY
WASHINGTON
— A newly formed consulting firm hired to account for more than $7.3
billion in Iraqi reconstruction money did not deliver a database that
could help investigators track waste and fraud, a recent report found. The
result: Two years after uncovering one major fraud case, auditors still
haven't determined whether there was more graft in the spending of
Iraqi oil proceeds. In April 2005, Stuart Bowen, the special
inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, recommended creating a
database to help review U.S. spending throughout Iraq. The
recommendation followed the discovery of an $8.6 million bid-rigging
scheme in south-central Iraq. Five months later, a U.S. contracting
office in Baghdad hired Reviewer Management International (RMI) of New
York to create a database that could link contracts with the officials
who authorized them. RMI, however, wasn't given adequate
instructions until near the end of its $1.5 million contract and, as a
result, didn't deliver a usable database, the inspector general's
office found in a follow-up report released Jan. 29. Employees
in the Baghdad contracting office took on the project, completed the
work and turned over the results to the Iraqi government in December.
Bowen promised Congress that his office will investigate further. Air
Force Lt. Col. Joe Mazur of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq said
Bowen's report was accurate. He said RMI got a "sole-source contract."
Such contracts are awarded without competitive bidding because only one
company is considered qualified to do the work quickly enough. Mazur
could not comment on the firm's qualifications because he was unable to
find a copy of its proposal. Robert Raggio, RMI's chairman and sole officer, did not respond to repeated telephone and e-mail messages seeking comment. The
United Nations gave the U.S.-led provisional Iraqi government control
over the country's oil proceeds — an account called the Development
Fund for Iraq (DFI) — shortly after the 2003 invasion. U.S. agencies
oversaw reconstruction projects using more than $7.3 billion of DFI
money through the middle of 2006, U.N. auditors say. In addition,
Bowen's office has found U.S. officials transferred $8.8 billion in oil
proceeds to interim Iraqi ministries without keeping track of the
money. Mismanagement of Iraqi money has angered some Democrats
in Congress, who say it may have increased costs for the United States,
which has spent $38 billion of taxpayer money on reconstruction. "If
this administration could not accomplish these (reconstruction) goals
with Iraqi money, how can they be trusted to be good stewards over
American taxpayer dollars?" asked Rep. William Lacy Clay, D-Mo., at a
House oversight committee hearing in February. Much of the Iraqi
oil money spent by the United States was given in bundles of $100 bills
to military officials and civilians to quickly pay for small-scale
projects, Bowen's office has reported. In 2004, the inspector
general began investigating $120 million in cash provided to American
officials at a regional reconstruction office in south-central Iraq.
That probe led to the largest criminal fraud case in Iraq so far, which
resulted in three guilty pleas and charges against five others. The
military hired RMI in September 2005 to compile records of all similar
cash transactions made throughout Iraq. Raggio incorporated the firm in
Delaware less than seven weeks before getting the contract. State
records show he listed the firm's office as a residence in Babylon,
N.Y., and its principal place of business as Iraq. Army
contracting officials didn't tell RMI until granting a one-month
extension to its eight-month contract that it should try "as time
permits" to link payment records to the U.S. officials who authorized
the spending, the report said. Although the RMI database
includes more than 300,000 entries, an unidentified military
contracting official is quoted in the report as saying it is "only a
collection of records that were not audited or effectively connected to
one another."

Recent Comments