The Washington Post published a large article (see bottom of this post) about 4 investigations of SIGIR work practices .(Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction - see www.Sigir.mil ) I worked with some of the SIGIR people in Baghdad, and met Stuart Bowen. They were probably the most effective audit group there (not the DoD or Dept. of State IG's, or USAID's IG, or DCAA or the military IG's). The GAO wasn't allowed there by the State Dept, but SIGIR had many skilled ex-GAO auditors. Visit their website if you want to see a huge amount of audit reports and white papers on Iraq spending.
Keep in mind they were only authorized to examine Iraq reconstruction spending, not US Military, or other non-reconstruction spending (i.e. USAID spending from non-reconstruction funded sources).
However, I had some disagreements with SIGIR -
1) They wouldn't audit USAID programs, even though USAID had $4-billion in reconstruction projects.
2) They wouldn't do front end audits of contracts - which is where you walk through a contract and describe work process improvements needed BEFORE spending happens, rather than wait until all the mistakes are made, then audit at the end to catch mistakes. Business has been doing such front end audits for years, but not most government agencies, which focus on compliance and "close out" audits.
3) They wouldn't do operational audits of the US Army run procurement system used for reconstruction spending, thus I couldn't get them to investigate, and write recommendations on US Army system weaknesses that allowed LOTS of mismanagement. SIGIR seemed to focus on contract and spending compliance with regulations, and not on mismanagement. Operational audits are a focus of professional internal auditors certified by the Institute of Internal Auditors. Most government auditors don't have that certification.
4) At the time I was there in 2004-early 2006, SIGIR only had about 10-20 auditors in Baghdad, but about 130+ staff back in Washington, DC. WHY?? Lots of people back in DC had cushy administration jobs, and wrote some naive white papers, while more auditors (or accounting analysts to fix system problems) were needed in Baghdad. One partial reason is that the State Dept. wouldn't give them much space or living quarters because State didn't like having an outside agency (SIGIR was established as an independent audit group under a Presidential Directive) looking at their turf (after State took over responsibility for the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office in July, 2004). State's IG staff was nowhere near the level of the SIGIR auditors. (We already discussed their IG, Krongard, in earlier posts).
5) SIGIR's appointee leader, Stuart Bowen, was a lawyer appointed by Pres. Bush, and gave direction for headline resulting audits, not more appropriate technical audits that would have fixed system problems early. Instead, they did "close out" audits AFTER spending was done, so he could issue audits that got news headlines. However, by getting publicity, he probably encouraged faster oversight by House and Senate oversight committees, who always interviewed him. Bowen was also known for disappearing for days at a time from the DC office where he mostly was "based". He only visited Baghdad about 1-week of each quarter.
However, SIGIR was still better than the other audit groups, and had independent clout. The guys in Baghdad were good, but I didn't hear that about the non-audit, top heavy staff in DC.
And, here are my comments about specific topics in the article below:
1. Huge overtime for auditors - early on, there were only about 10 auditors, and they earned their money. I even talked to them once about working for SIGIR, but decided to stay with CPI. The article says people complained about big auditor overtime, but what they don't say is that that most auditors were very experienced, and were earning $125k already in normal Federal salaries, and when they added the two 25% standard bonuses (for danger zone, and hardship pay - now they are 35% each for a total of 70%), they could easily reach the Federal salary cap of about $210,000 before the end of 12 months. Because of the add-ons, they actually didn't ALL need overtime, and they couldn't work more OT to meet Bowen's aggressive audit schedules. So, some were pushed into more OT because Bowen wanted more work done, and they had a hard time hiring people in 2004 and 2005. EVERYBODY in Baghdad was getting the add-ons (my words, not theirs), working overtime and many in IRMO reached the salary cap. The article mentions one auditor who got $346,000 - I don't see how if the salary cap was $215,000 in 2006. One way some got higher amounts was to work in one year with overtime until they hit the limit, then take leave until the next year, then return and work overtime for a new salary cap. One Sr. Advisor for Telecommunications was notorious and did it TWICE in two sessions of about 6-months in 2004 and 2005. He is the one that should have been audited and I bet some complaints about him were filed with IG's or SIGIR. I tried to get IRMO to set up their own internal audit group, but it didn't happen. However, unofficially, I acted as a reviewer of some SIGIR audit reports for them before they were issued to evaluate accuracy. SIGIR staff were much more sophisticated than most IRMO staff regarding audit evidence and reports, thus they kind of ran over IRMO since they did not have a trained CFO or internal auditor to stand up to them about the contents in the reports.
2) Spending $3.5-million on a book project. I read one of the early versions for factual accuracy for IRMO while in Baghdad, and it was all external research by people in Washington DC who talked to early staff who worked in Iraq, but the writers (Deloitte & Touche? mentioned also in the article) NEVER actually visited Iraq or talked to staff still working in Iraq at the time of writing the book. I had to review it for accuracy on behalf of IRMO, and told them it was all old information that didn't make any real recommendations and was not about current situations. It was more like a history of IRMO book with over 100 pages and was later posted on Sigir.mil . I had been told in early 2006 that the contractor that had people writing the book were "good friends" of someone in SIGIR (Ginger Cruz - mentioned in the article which says she used to work at D&T). Many of the workers in IRMO hq in DC were contractors, from what I was told. In my mind, they had too much money, and found people to help spend it on non-audit activities Most normal audit departments focus on having auditors in the field, and they should have had 60-80% of their staff in the field in Baghdad, not sitting in DC. However, as a record of how processes failed in Iraq, the book had merit.
3. Snooping in email messages of staff members - SIGIR used military email plus they had State Dept. emails like we did. (Originally, in 2004, everyone had email on a dedicated IRMO internal email system, then we moved to a military system, then State Dept. - the story about screwed up email systems and planning could be a book by itself...) However, if they snoop in late 2004 or 2005 SIGIR emails, they might find emails from me to SIGIR leaders documenting the breakdowns in the US Army procurement system for IRMO, and pleading to get an audit of them and USAID projects. I know I got so mad at the US Army's procurement mismanagement one time I sat down and wrote for about 4 hours straight and sent the emotional email to the SIGIR Baghdad leader. As for snooping, we were always told that our email was subject to reviews, and IT security caught some military officers who posted Secret documents on the public email, and the State Dept. researched emails from the new CFO in early 2006 and fired him for emailing info to the press (that was the rumor ) - I had no direct info on that, but they turned off his email before they fired him, and came and took his PC's hard drive in the same day - but I was there in the office when it happened. Oh, and he had no CFO experience - they replaced him with an ex figher pilot and retired Lt. Col from the Air Force who didn't understand any accounting. That is when I decided to leave - not one guy in the new CFO office was experienced in accounting and finance except me and one Captain. They were all hired through Bearingpoint because the DC based office of IRMO lost their good recruiter, and a very weak one couldn't find any candidates.
As mentioned at the top, I thought the SIGIR auditors still did a great job, but their audit reports were modified in DC for publicity gains and Bowen demanded extravagant statements of potential losses not supported by audit evidence - and the DC staff was overstaffed vs the number of auditors in Baghdad. For instance, some 2005 reports took "shots" at IRMO in unprofessional ways, and discussions with the local Baghdad SIGIR auditors indicated the reports were rewritten in DC to use inflammatory words to get publicity. Thus I volunteered to review the SIGIR reports for accuracy on behalf of IRMO in late 2005 and early 2006 and we reduced some of the extravagant claims. That is supported by the article below which says they revised a total "savings" over $1-billion down to $95-million. They could have found much more if they did operational audits like businesses do.
Review of the Comments submitted on the Washington Post website
- Some people complained that the writer and other investigations were doing hit pieces against Bowen as repayment for exposing problems in Iraq. When I was in Iraq, we all thought Bush was showing courage to let SIGIR report on issues to clean stuff up rather than hide it. Believe me, the State Dept. and USAID resisted any oversight by outsiders, and they needed reviews. IRMO, and its spending was supervised by two past US State Dept. Ambassadors who had no business or project management experience. Procurement was run by US Army systems that Bush had no control over - the military just didn't focus much on cost control or accounting controls or "efficiency, effectiveness and economy". In comparison, the much maligned KBR (Halliburton) ran the camp and food operations very well.
So, even though SIGIR was still somewhat effective, and the SIGIR auditors I knew in Baghdad were professional, next time, Bush or future presidents should appoint experienced audit professionals, not attorneys, to run SIGIR type operations (and also Cabinet Inspector Generals!!!). Then many findings might have been solved in private earlier to improve the credibility of the reconstruction program. Attorneys don't understand accounting or controls, and try to turn reports on them into flamboyant statements to get attention, rather than focus on improving the systems in place.
vj
==================================================
from the Washington Post on Friday, December 14, 2007 at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/13/AR2007121302178_pf.html
Note: As of 4 days later, there were 60+ comments posted to the Washington Post's website about this article - so go to the above web address if you want to see them.
Inspector General for Iraq Under Investigation
FBI, Congress Among Those Probing Allegations of Overspending, Mismanagement
By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 14, 2007; A01
Over the past four years, Inspector General Stuart W. Bowen Jr. and his staff have probed allegations of waste and fraud in the $22 billion U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq. Their work has led to arrests, indictments and millions of dollars in fines. And it has earned Bowen, who had been a legal adviser to President Bush, many admirers among both parties on Capitol Hill for his efforts to identify overspending and mismanagement.
But Bowen's office has also been roiled by allegations of its own overspending and mismanagement. Current and former employees have complained about overtime policies that allowed 10 staff members to earn more than $250,000 each last year. They have questioned the oversight of a $3.5 million book project about Iraq's reconstruction modeled after the 9/11 Commission report. And they have alleged that Bowen and his deputy have improperly snooped into their staff's e-mail messages.
The employee allegations have prompted four government probes into the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), including an investigation by the FBI and federal prosecutors into the agency's financial practices and claims of e-mail monitoring, according to law enforcement sources and SIGIR staff members. Federal prosecutors have presented evidence of alleged wrongdoing to a grand jury in Virginia, which has subpoenaed SIGIR for thousands of pages of financial documents, contracts, personnel records and correspondence, several sources familiar with the probe said.
The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, the Presidential Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Army's Equal Employment Opportunity Office are also engaged in separate investigations into complaints from SIGIR staff members, according to current and former SIGIR officials and others familiar with the individual probes. The allegations range from retaliatory firing of a whistle-blower to "sustained patterns of inappropriate behavior," according to employee complaints obtained by The Washington Post.
Bowen declined a request for an interview but addressed several questions by e-mail. He said that "no current SIGIR official has been notified that he or she is the subject or target of any such investigation." He also said the congressional investigation had ended, and he refused to comment on the complaint to the Army.
Spokesmen for the FBI, the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Virginia and the presidential council refused to comment, but law enforcement sources said all three investigations are continuing. David Marin, the minority staff director of the House oversight committee, said yesterday that the congressional investigation, which focuses on charges made by SIGIR whistle-blowers, "is ongoing."
There are now so many probes that a senior SIGIR official said the agency's Crystal City headquarters is "gripped by paranoia. It's almost a siege mentality."
That official, and more than two dozen other current and former SIGIR employees interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity because FBI and presidential council officials have asked them to refrain from public comments while the investigations proceed. Others did not want to be quoted by name because of fear of retribution by top SIGIR officials.
SIGIR was created by Congress in 2004 to act as the chief watchdog over the effort to stabilize Iraq by building hospitals and schools, training security forces and increasing electricity production. The agency quickly earned a reputation as a tenacious, apolitical investigative body, identifying cases of corruption, wasteful spending and mismanagement that have led to 13 arrests and more than $17 million in fines.
Members of Congress have heaped praise on Bowen, who served as a legal adviser to Bush when he was governor of Texas. He has been asked to testify at dozens of congressional hearings. Democrats have expressed particular delight that a close ally of the president's was willing to speak out about problems with Iraq's reconstruction.
SIGIR claimed in an October 2006 report that its "financial impact" -- the cost savings resulting from its work, the funds it recovered and other benefits -- was as much as $1.87 billion. The report led to an extension of SIGIR's mandate last December. "SIGIR's oversight during this process has been essential to ensuring that the taxpayers' dollars are being used effectively and efficiently," Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) said at the time.
But after other government agencies challenged that figure, arguing that proper accounting standards were not used in calculating the estimate and that SIGIR did not distinguish between U.S. funds and Iraqi funds, SIGIR revised the number in a report this summer. The new estimate was less than $95 million, only 5 percent of the previous claim.
Government investigators have requested copies of many SIGIR records on costs and savings, according to an investigative document and people familiar with the probe. SIGIR changed its calculations this year, Bowen said, to reflect actual savings and not potential savings.
As SIGIR grew in prominence, dissension was growing within the agency's offices. In 2006, several former SIGIR employees sent an eight-page complaint to the presidential council, an executive-branch oversight body, alleging that the agency's leaders had engaged in fraud, violated federal regulations, created a hostile workplace, abused their positions and "sustained patterns of inappropriate behavior." The council launched an investigation and eventually referred some of the matters to the FBI.
In an e-mail to SIGIR staff members, Bowen described the complaint filed with the presidential council as a result of "disgruntled former employees."
Since then, investigators have broadened their inquiry to include allegations that SIGIR management may have tried to influence staff members who were sought for questioning by investigators, according to people familiar with the inquiry.
Among the issues that have sparked the most internal tension have been SIGIR's overtime practices. Last year, 30 agency employees earned more than the $165,200 salary of a senator or a congressman, according to internal SIGIR documents obtained by The Post. Seven earned $100,000 or more above their salaries, the documents show. More than two dozen earned more than the $174,900 in salary and benefits paid last year to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq. One SIGIR inspector, who had a $142,000 base salary, earned $346,017 last year, in part by claiming more than 1,200 hours of overtime.
SIGIR staff members, like other federal civilian employees, receive hazard and hardship pay equal to 70 percent of their salaries when they are in Iraq.
At least 30 SIGIR employees charged between 800 and 1,400 hours of overtime and compensatory time in 2006 -- up to almost nine months of additional work stuffed into the year. Thirty-seven others charged between 200 and 725 hours of overtime and comp time.
"The number of hours didn't wash," said a senior SIGIR official. "It's physically and mentally impossible to work that many hours."
Bowen's deputy, Ginger Cruz, said SIGIR's overtime practices are "cost-effective" because one employee earning maximum overtime is cheaper than hiring two people. She said SIGIR this year reduced overtime allowances to 24 hours per two-week pay period. She also noted that other U.S. government agencies provide generous financial packages to employees serving in Iraq.
Federal employee salaries are subject to an annual cap, which is $215,000 for this year. But additional earnings can be paid out the following year or after workers leave the agency.
Government investigators are also probing SIGIR's other expenses, including the book project about Iraq's reconstruction, according to staff members questioned by investigators. The presidential council informed SIGIR last year that the agency was being investigated for "possible fraud, waste and abuse in connection with the printing of the SIGIR history book and possible false statements made to the Office of Management and Budget to justify SIGIR funding," according to a copy of a letter from the council to SIGIR obtained by The Post.
Bowen described the book as SIGIR's "potentially most important project" in a memo he sent last month to the secretaries of state and defense and eight congressional committees.
According to people questioned by investigators and documents obtained by The Post, one of the most serious allegations that the FBI and federal prosecutors are probing is whether top SIGIR officials broke federal laws by accessing employee e-mail messages stored on computers maintained by the Army without proper authorization.
At least four former senior SIGIR officials said they told investigators that Bowen and Cruz looked at employee e-mail. One of them claimed to be an eyewitness to Bowen going through the e-mail of three employees. Another said Bowen and Cruz read the messages "to find out who was loyal and who was not."
The former officials said the e-mail monitoring began in 2005, before the government investigations commenced. They said the monitoring continued into this year in an effort to identify employees suspected of speaking with investigators and other government agencies.
In an interview, Cruz said she participated in administrative investigations "some time ago" that involved a "limited review" of three people's e-mail. Bowen said that "SIGIR policy states that employees do not have an expectation of privacy in the use of their government computers. . . . E-mail reviews can, and have been, conducted by SIGIR management to investigate allegations of work-related misconduct."
The investigations are focusing largely on the actions of Bowen and Cruz, according to current and former senior staff members who have been questioned, as well as congressional sources and other U.S. officials familiar with the probes.
Cruz, a former spokeswoman for the governor of Guam, originally joined SIGIR as a contractor working for the accounting firm Deloitte & Touche. Current and former SIGIR employees have told investigators that Cruz threatened to put hexes on employees and made inappropriate sexual remarks in the presence of staff members. Cruz is a self-described wiccan, a member of a polytheistic religion of modern witchcraft. "We warned Ginger not to talk about witchcraft, that it would scare people," a former SIGIR employee said.
Cruz denied making comments of a "sexual nature" and noted that she was cleared of any wrongdoing by an internal SIGIR investigation into the claim.
After the detailed but anonymous complaint was sent to the presidential council, Cruz sought special dispensation from Bowen for SIGIR to pay her legal fees -- an uncommon practice within government, according to U.S. officials. So far, the agency has paid for more than $32,000 of Cruz's legal fees, according to copies of the invoices provided by SIGIR under a Freedom of Information Act request. Bowen said the agency's general counsel advised him that the payment of Cruz's legal fees was permissible.
The Army's Equal Employment Opportunity Office probe is focusing on a complaint by a former employee who had raised allegations of SIGIR discrimination in the dismissal of her African American assistant, which she charges led to her own dismissal in retaliation. The employee, Denise Burgess, stated in her complaint that she was terminated on the same day she spoke to the presidential council, just two months after receiving an $8,500 bonus from Bowen for exemplary work. Current and former SIGIR employees said they have been asked by FBI investigators about Burgess's termination.
Several staffers interviewed at the suggestion of SIGIR expressed loyalty to Bowen. One senior staff member said he has not seen any firsthand evidence of illegal or inappropriate behavior.
Several current and former officials expressed concern that the practices of SIGIR's leaders are discrediting the work of the agency. "SIGIR's purpose was to look at reconstruction and then go away," said a former senior official. "Are they contributing to the good anymore? No. Were they before? Yes. But they should have stuck to the plan and been willing to stand down in 2008."
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.
Recent Comments