Corruption In Iraq & World

End of the Line - This is my last Corruption in Iraq Posting

Tavares, FL - July 17, 2011 / Updated Feb. 19, 2018 -  I give up.   I have been writing this blog on corruption in Iraq and the World, including Afghanistan, since mid-2006.  Except for updates described below, I am no longer posting actively to this blog.

Vance Jochim  -  July 17, 2011

[email protected]  or FiscalRangers#@comcast.net  

 

The short link to this blog is:  http://webworks.typepad.com/corruption_in_iraq/  

 

Updated Feb. 19, 2018 - Since this post, I have been posting periodic reports from SIGAR or SIGIR and other news reports on Corruption.  

In 2005, I had this flag designed for the anti-corruption agency I was in, and it was used at many events.  

 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) WAS at www.Sigir.mil  

But the old SIGIR.mil URL no longer works or forwards you to the archive of the website. 

So the entire SIGIR.mil website is now archived at the Univ. of North TX CyberCemetary HERE.   

And here is an archived version of SIGIR's last Lessons Learned report. 

And HERE is the Wikipedia page on SIGIR.   

And, the former head of SIGIR is Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. and he is on LinkedIn.  

Status of the website for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR.mil) - As of Feb. 2018, SIGAR is still active and conducting audits.  Many of their reports and issues are the same ones I saw from SIGIR in Iraq.  The State Dept. never learns.  Here is their about page:  https://www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1    

The news on corruption keeps repeating itself and the US State Dept and USAID don't improve, and neither does the corruption climate in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Congress keeps having hearings, and issuing reports, but they don't fire anyone and establish known methods to reduce corruption in foreign aid and reconstruction programs in "conflict" countries.

Besides, the Wall St. Journal now has a "Corruption Currents" blog with daily postings and two guys who are PAID to do it, so why compete?   However, they have no clue how to FIX corruption, just report it.

Here is the link to one of their recent postings on their online blog:

http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/07/15/high-tide-from-metros-sagging-shares-to-ancient-egyptian-artifacts/?mod=WSJBlog  

If you want to see my lists of actions to take to reduce corruption in foreign countries, look in the PAGES section in the right column for my article on Vance Jochim's 28+ Ways to Reduce Corruption.

If you are on a US Congressional Committee investigating Corruption, and want to learn how to actually fix it and not just listen to people talking about it and issuing reports, contact me.

And, if you are a country leader and want to actually fix corruption, and not just talk about it, send me an email to FiscalRangers AT Comcast DOT net.

Vance Jochim  -  July 17, 2011

[email protected]  or FiscalRangers#@comcast.net  

This website copyrighted by Vance Jochim Feb. 19, 2018 , but there is probably a much earlier notice on another page since I started this in 2006 after I returned from Iraq.  Permission is granted to use any content as long as it is attributed to Vance Jochim and a link is provided to this page.  

US Anti-Corruption adviser to the Iraqi anti-corruption agency, Commission on Integrity, 2004-2006.

 

 

Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Afghanistan

Here is an interesting video or written reports from SIGAR about re-integration of foreign fighters in Afghanistan if they get the Taliban to stand down.

Divided Responsibility: The U.S. Approach to Security Sector Assistance in Afghanistan event at CSIS

Here is an audio recording of SIGAR Head John F. Sopko speaking at a security meeting recently.  
An outline of his talk is below, along with the link to the audio recording. 
VJ

SIGAR's 44th Quarterly Report to Congress

Here is the latest quarterly update from SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) on corruption and audits of reconstruction spending in Afghanistan. (The cartoon is from the internet, not SIGAR).
Vance Jochim

Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan

This is from a publicity release sent out June 21, 2019 by SIGAR. The image is from the internet, not SIGAR:

SIGAR ( Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction) has released its sixth lessons learned report, entitled "Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan." The report examines the patchwork of security sector assistance programs undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001.

 

Key points:
-- -- Despite the U.S. appropriating $83.3 billion in U.S. security-related funds, there is not one person, agency, country, or military service that has had sole responsibility for overseeing security sector assistance in Afghanistan.

-- The security sector assistance mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring and comprehensive plan to guide its efforts. Critical aspects of the advisory mission were not unified by a common purpose, nor was there a clear plan to guide equipping decisions over time. A former CSTC-A commander described the ANDSF as a "collection of compromises," and compared looking at the ANDSF to "a cross section of sedimentary rock [with] each year's U.S. budget priorities and 'good ideas' layered across older ones."

-- The dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander did not have absolute authority over how the ANDSF was trained and advised in different parts of Afghanistan. This created asymmetries in ANDSF development and impeded the standardization of security sector assistance programs. 

-- Security sector assistance efforts in Afghanistan have been hindered by the lack of clear command-and-control relationships between the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy, as well as between ministerial and tactical advising efforts. This has resulted in disjointed efforts to develop ANDSF capabilities. 

-- The United States has not adequately involved the Afghans in key decisions and processes. As a result, the United States has implemented systems that the Afghans will not be able to maintain without U.S. support. As one former CSTC-A commander told us: "The Afghans were informed and directed, not asked or consulted..."

-- Most predeployment training did not adequately prepare advisors for their work in Afghanistan. Training did not expose advisors to Afghan systems, processes, weapons, culture, doctrine, and history.

-- NATO nations provided unique capabilities that the U.S. government used to fill voids in U.S. security sector assistance programs. However, problems with coordinating command-and-control hindered the United States' ability to make the most of coalition support.

-- The ANDSF were unable to fully leverage the benefits of U.S.-based training efforts due to high AWOL rates, repurposing trained personnel to unrelated tasks once deployed back into Afghanistan, and ANDSF policies that conflicted with U.S.-based training program deadlines. Because of these issues, the United States plans to stop all U.S.-based aviation training for the Afghan Air Force by December 31, 2020.

-- U.S.-based training of Afghan pilots and maintainers is routinely considered successful and a best practice. A DOD official stated that U.S.-based training for the Afghans is "head and shoulders above aviation training in Afghanistan."

Full Report: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-LL.pdf

Lauren Mick | Public Affairs Specialist
Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
Office: 703.697.5307
Cell: 571.645.6530
www.sigar.mil  
twitter.com/SIGARHQ 
facebook.com/SIGARHQ

 

Corruption Conferences held by the IACC - International Conference on Corruption

The IACC has annual worldwide conferences on Corruption issues with attendees from many countries.

This link is just to the one in 1999, and all the documents presented are attached in a long list.

Later conferences should have videos.

You can go to http://iacconference.org/en.1.html to see other Conferences, which seem to have ended in 2012.

This 1999 repository has many case studies of corruption in different countries.

Vance Jochim

FiscalRangers.com 

Added May, 2019 - because when I was in Iraq in 2005, I was perusing the State Dept. document libraries and found mention that Al Gore led a conference on corruption.   Only now did I find this conference had Al Gore as a keynote speaker, so this must be what I saw. 

 

 

2013 Anti-Corruption related report from the Afghanistan Justice Organization

I stumbled across this report in 2018, but it provides some good insight why AFG is still corrupt.

http://afghanjustice.org/uploads/new/AJO-Court-Observation-Report-2013.pdf 

October 2018 Quarterly Report

Here is the latest quarterly SIGAR report.

On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 10:00 AM George-Nichol, Jennifer CIV (US) <[email protected]> wrote:

Today, SIGAR released its forty-first Quarterly Report to Congress. Key Points: -- Afghan government control or influence of its districts reached the lowest level (55.5%) since SIGAR began tracking district control in November 2015. -- Since that time, Afghan government control and influence over its districts has declined by about 16 percentage points; contested districts have increased by about 11 points; and insurgent control or influence has risen by 5.5 points. -- UNAMA recorded 649 civilian casualties (313 deaths and 336 injuries) due to aerial operations by progovernment forces from January 1 to September 30, 2018, a 39% increase in from the same period in 2017 and a record number of civilian casualties caused by air strikes since UNAMA began recording civilian-casualty data in 2009. -- RS data reflects far fewer civilian casualties due to air strikes. From January 1 through August 15, RS recorded a total of 102 civilian casualties due to U.S. (29 casualties) and AAF (73) air strikes, less than a sixth of the 649 reported by UNAMA through September 30, 2018. -- The Department of Justice reported that the attorney general’s performance is deficient, his accomplishments are lacking, and he fails to cooperate with the U.S. Embassy on anticorruption matters. DOJ also told State that the attorney general has misled U.S. officials on the progress of anticorruption efforts. -- DOJ reports that the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) is attempting to placate donors by pursuing a number of low-level, rather than high-level, corruption cases. The Department described the ACJC as insufficiently mission-focused, saying it instead “frets, stews over slights, snipes at other colleagues, and has a perpetual sense of entitlement.” -- Afghanistan’s attorney general has criticized the State Department-supported CMS (Case Management System) and has resisted its implementation. DOJ believes the attorney general’s motive for resistance to CMS is “a concern that more transparency will shine a light on his unproductive, corrupt, and patronage-laden office.” -- The ANDSF struggled to maintain its personnel strength this quarter with ANDSF strength at its lowest level recorded in the third quarter of the year since 2012. ANDSF strength decreased by 1,914 personnel since last quarter and by 8,827 personnel since the same period last year. The ANDSF is roughly 40,000 personnel, or 11%, below their target strength of 352,000 personnel. -- RS classified the exact strength data for female personnel in the ANDSF this quarter, and reported efforts to recruit women for the ANA are currently on hold. MOD is not actively recruiting women for the ANA. -- According to USFOR-A, there were 23 reported green-on-green insider attacks against ANDSF personnel from May 17 to August 26, 2018, bringing this year’s total to 56 insider attacks. As a result, the ANDSF incurred 42 casualties (28 killed and 14 wounded) this quarter, and sustained a total of 121 ANDSF casualties (85 killed and 36 wounded) from January 1 to August 26, 2018. -- Due to a severe drought affecting large swaths of Afghanistan, USAID has reported an expected wheat harvest deficit of 2.5 million metric tons. The UN reports that in 2018 alone, 275,000 people were displaced by the drought – 52,000 more people than the ongoing conflict had displaced during the same period. -- From 2002 through September 2018, the United States has committed an average of more than $1.5 million a day to help the Afghan government combat narcotics. Despite this, 2017 poppy cultivation is more than four times that reported by the UNODC for 2002, the first full year of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. -- However, counternarcotics seems to have fallen completely off the U.S. agenda. The State Department’s new “Integrated Country Strategy” for Afghanistan no longer includes counternarcotics as a priority, but instead subsumes the issue into general operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. military says it has no counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan, and USAID says it will not plan, design, or implement new programs to address opium-poppy cultivation. Full Quarterly Report: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-10-30qr.pdf Quarterly Report by Section: https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/index.aspx?SSR=6 Report Photos:  
Jennifer George-Nichol | Public AffairsOffice of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)Office: 703.545.5980Mobile: 571.645.6748 sigar.mil twitter.com/SIGARHQ facebook.com/SIGARHQ 

Vance Jochim
352-638-3578
Tavares, FL

Lake County, FL Fiscal Watchdog blogger

FiscalRangers.com

[email protected]

Whistleblower book on Goldman Sachs just published - Noncompliant by Carmen Segarra

Tavares, FL                 Oct. 14, 20

This has nothing to do with Corruption in Iraq, but the book is notable where a former bank examiner made recordings of Goldman Sachs execs and basically blew the whistle on how they manipulated US Securities rules.

Great job Carmen Segarra.   (Note: I tried to find her on Twitter, but only could find a fake account to a female in Puerto Rico.

Here is a review by the NY Post.

Here is an audio book clip.

Vance Jochim

FiscalRangers.com 

 

July 2018 Quarterly Report

The latest SIGAR quarterly report to Congress on Afghan Corruption

SIGAR Review of Afghan Ring Road Construction

Great report!
A suggestion - you might always include a picture of the report's topic to enhance the visual appeal of the emailed report summary.

Vance Jochim
Former Chief Auditor, Commission of Public Integrity (Iraq)
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (2004-2006)

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 11:08 PM, Vance Jochim <[email protected]> wrote:

Report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) on Failure of a $721-million road grant in Afghanistan

From: Mick, Lauren E CIV SIGAR CCR (US) <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:57 AM
Subject: SIGAR Review of Afghan Ring Road Construction

Today, SIGAR released a review of the construction of a 233-kilometer segment of Afghanistan's Ring Road between Qeysar and Laman. Since 2006, the project has been funded by five separate grants from the Asian Development Bank totaling $721 million.

The review found: