Periodic analysis and discussion about corruption in Iraq and other countries from a consultant and Certified Internal Auditor who worked in Baghdad for 23 months to help setup the new Iraqi anti-corruption agency, Commission of Public Integrity (CPI). This main page contains postings for the current month. Go to categories list or scroll down to archive lists to see earlier entries. You can also reach this blog by visiting www.FiscalRangers.com .
This is from a publicity release sent out June 21, 2019 by SIGAR. The image is from the internet, not SIGAR:
SIGAR ( Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction) has released its sixth lessons learned report, entitled "Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan." The report examines the patchwork of security sector assistance programs undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001.
Key points: -- -- Despite the U.S. appropriating $83.3 billion in U.S. security-related funds, there is not one person, agency, country, or military service that has had sole responsibility for overseeing security sector assistance in Afghanistan.
-- The security sector assistance mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring and comprehensive plan to guide its efforts. Critical aspects of the advisory mission were not unified by a common purpose, nor was there a clear plan to guide equipping decisions over time. A former CSTC-A commander described the ANDSF as a "collection of compromises," and compared looking at the ANDSF to "a cross section of sedimentary rock [with] each year's U.S. budget priorities and 'good ideas' layered across older ones."
-- The dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander did not have absolute authority over how the ANDSF was trained and advised in different parts of Afghanistan. This created asymmetries in ANDSF development and impeded the standardization of security sector assistance programs.
-- Security sector assistance efforts in Afghanistan have been hindered by the lack of clear command-and-control relationships between the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy, as well as between ministerial and tactical advising efforts. This has resulted in disjointed efforts to develop ANDSF capabilities.
-- The United States has not adequately involved the Afghans in key decisions and processes. As a result, the United States has implemented systems that the Afghans will not be able to maintain without U.S. support. As one former CSTC-A commander told us: "The Afghans were informed and directed, not asked or consulted..."
-- Most predeployment training did not adequately prepare advisors for their work in Afghanistan. Training did not expose advisors to Afghan systems, processes, weapons, culture, doctrine, and history.
-- NATO nations provided unique capabilities that the U.S. government used to fill voids in U.S. security sector assistance programs. However, problems with coordinating command-and-control hindered the United States' ability to make the most of coalition support.
-- The ANDSF were unable to fully leverage the benefits of U.S.-based training efforts due to high AWOL rates, repurposing trained personnel to unrelated tasks once deployed back into Afghanistan, and ANDSF policies that conflicted with U.S.-based training program deadlines. Because of these issues, the United States plans to stop all U.S.-based aviation training for the Afghan Air Force by December 31, 2020.
-- U.S.-based training of Afghan pilots and maintainers is routinely considered successful and a best practice. A DOD official stated that U.S.-based training for the Afghans is "head and shoulders above aviation training in Afghanistan."
Lauren Mick | Public Affairs Specialist Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Office: 703.697.5307 Cell: 571.645.6530 www.sigar.mil twitter.com/SIGARHQ facebook.com/SIGARHQ
From: ProPublica [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, May 15, 2015 10:00 AM Subject: How the U.S. Military Spent $2B in Afghanistan
Friday, May 15, 2015
Money as a Weapons System by Megan McCloskey, Mike Tigas, Ryann Grochowski Jones, Sisi Wei, Jeff Larson, ProPublica, and Ingrid Burrington, Special to ProPublica |How U.S. commanders spent $2 billion of petty cash in Afghanistan.
The military’s mantra for Afghanistan was “winning hearts and minds.” And a key part of that strategy was cold, hard cash.
During a decade of war, the Pentagon gave more than $2 billion to commanders to spend as they wished on a broadly defined grab bag of “urgent humanitarian” needs. The goal was to gain support from the locals for both the U.S. military and the nascent Afghan government. It was, the military said: “money as a weapons system.”
Troops spent their mad money in a myriad of ways. Nearly $5,000 went to a father whose daughter and son were caught in crossfire. Another $182,000 was doled out on sweaters. A motorcycle shop owner received a $903microgrant to replace equipment the Taliban stole. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent on large projects, such as a hospital in a rural area that had no healthcare.
-----Original Message----- From: Bronstein-Moffly, Alexander H (Alex) CIV SIGAR CCR (US) Sent: Friday, May 15, 2015 9:30 AM Subject: $562 Million in US Assistance for Afghan Civil Aviation Sector
Today, SIGAR released an audit of the $562.2 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan's civil aviation sector, primarily administered by the DOD ($500 million) and the FAA ($56.5 million).
The audit notes:
-- The U.S. and its international partners have succeeded in strengthening Afghanistan's civil aviation capabilities over the past 12 years.
-- Despite accomplishments, the U.S. could not transfer airspace management operations to the Afghan government at the end of 2014, as it had originally planned, due in part to a lack of trained Afghan civil aviation personnel, particularly air traffic controllers.
-- Despite its efforts, the FAA was not able to train enough air traffic controllers for Afghanistan to operate airspace management services on its own
-- As of October 2014, the majority of the FAA-trained Afghan personnel had not yet completed required on-the-job training programs.
-- FAA attempted to train students abroad, but faced problems obtaining passports and visas for the students, and some students did not return to Afghanistan after being sent for training in other countries, including the U.S. Additionally, due to security concerns, Afghan students could not access the facilities they needed for on-the-job training.
-- The Afghan government's failure to award an airspace management contract resulted in the U.S. paying $29.5 million for an interim contract to continue those services. The Afghan government did not award a contract, citing what it believed to be excessive costs. Unless the Afghan government awards a follow-on contract before the interim contract expires, the U.S. government could be called upon to fund another interim contract.
-- The Afghan government uses only a portion of the about $34.5 million revenue collected from airspace over-flight fees for civil aviation purposes, despite the government's stated commitment of using its civil aviation revenue to finance aviation services and infrastructure development.
SIGAR is Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
He repeats most of the exact same problems reported by SIGIR (IRAQ) during my time in Iraq in 2004-2006. At least Iraq had oil revenue to pay more for the costs than Afghanistan.
Even the problem with State Dept. programs having no metrics and no ability to show success for their spending.
Just think, when I was at IRMO in Iraq, we got a huge $22-million to spend, and now Afghanistan is getting $104-billion.
Today, SIGAR released its April 2014 Quarterly Report to Congress. The report highlights the threat corruption poses and provides an overview of the Afghanistan reconstruction effort. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated nearly $103.2 billion to rebuild Afghanistan -- the most the United States has spent on reconstruction of any other nation.
--Page 19: The 20 audits, inspections, and other reports issued this quarter examined programs and projects worth about $31 billion.
--Page 68: Approximately $17.9 billion of appropriated funds remain for possible disbursement.
--Page 109: The United States has provided $7.5 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Latest UNODC estimates are for an all-time high of opium-poppy cultivation.
--Page ii: Afghan revenues in 2014 could cover as little as one-third of the country's $7.5 billion budget.
If you would like any additional information or have any questions please do not hesitate to reach out to me or our Director of Public Affairs, Phil LaVelle, at [email protected] or (703) 545-5974.
Best,
Alex
Alex Bronstein-Moffly
Deputy Director of Public Affairs
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
April 15, 2014 (tax day) - Note: Cartoon is from internet, not SIGAR.
This SIGAR Press Release distributed Apr. `5, 2014
Today, SIGAR (Special Inspection General for Aghanistan Reconstruction) released an audit of the $198-million effort to develop Afghan customs revenue capacity. The report found U.S. programs have had some success, but challenges will limit customs revenue as a sustainable source of income for Afghanistan. Among the findings:
--Corruption impacts all levels of the customs process & is the biggest problem affecting Afghan customs revenue.
--USAID & Afghan officials believe customs revenue could double if corruption were significantly reduced.
--Border Management Task Force (BMTF) noted that at one customs location alone, an estimated $25 million in wheat & rice imports is lost to criminal networks annually.
--BMTF also reports that Afghans who properly collect customs duties are subject to kidnapping & intimidation.
--Current cash-based customs payment system inefficient, leaves customs brokers vulnerable to theft & increases opportunities for corruption.
--Electronic payment system delayed, due in part to a proposal by an Afghan official to allow only one Afghan bank to process all electronic payments.
If you would like any additional information or have any questions please do not hesitate to reach out to me or our Director of Public Affairs, Phil LaVelle, at [email protected] or (703) 545-5974.
Best,
Alex
Alex Bronstein-Moffly
Public Affairs Specialist
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The head of SIGAR, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, gave his quarterly report to Congress recently, and here is a good report from POGO:
I inserted my comments.
Hearing Spotlights Afghanistan Corruption and Waste
On Thursday, the House Subcommittee on National Security held a hearing titled “Afghanistan: Identifying and Addressing Wasteful U.S. Government Spending.” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) official Donald Sampler testified.
The U.S. has committed more money to rebuilding Afghanistan than to any other single country in our history—$102 billion since 2002. The hearing focused on USAID’s efforts to help rebuild the country’s political, economic, and social infrastructure, which have cost taxpayers more than $18 billion. Sampler discussed his agency’s successes over the last 12 years, emphasizing that Afghanistan is a difficult environment in which to work.
Sopko’s written testimony lays out four lessons learned from USAID’s efforts in Afghanistan, all of which have relevance to future contingency operations.
Lesson #1: Reconstruction programs must take into account the recipient country’s ability to afford the costs of operating and sustaining them.
USAID has implemented projects and built infrastructure without articulating a clear plan for ensuring that the Afghan government can sustain them. The risks of unreasonable sustainability expectations include cost overruns, project delays, wasted funds (resulting in what SIGAR calls “stranded assets”), and a loss of international confidence in the U.S.
(Neither SIGAR or USAID have learned the lessons we learned in Iraq when I was there - in 2005, we discovered the same problem - The Iraqis (and generically, it seems developing middle east or arabic countries) have no maintenance gene when getting foreign aid to pay for capital projects, whether trucks or $10-million generators. Since the items are FREE, they fail to assign maintenance budgets or people to maintain equipment. That is a huge reason to never give them capital goods unless a maintenance contract is part of it. vj)
Lesson #2: Reconstruction of a conflict-ridden state is inherently risky, and that risk must be properly mitigated.
USAID and other donors must not only worry about the safety of their workers in Afghanistan, they must also take steps to safeguard funds from corruption. “Corruption poses the most severe threat to the integrity of U.S. government reconstruction aid to Afghanistan,” according to SIGAR. Indeed, most of the hearing focused on steps USAID is taking to address the massive amount of corruption in Afghanistan. In January, SIGAR caused a stir when it issued an audit report that found billions of dollars in USAID assistance provided directly to Afghan ministries is at high risk of misuse.
(This has always been a huge risk and mistake. NEVER trust third world governments to actually use the funds you give them for what they are intended. Another reason to discontinue foreign aid to such countries. If they are in the lower half of Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception index, axe the funds. vj)
Lesson #3: Oversight is a critical element of reconstruction.
SIGAR acknowledges that oversight in Afghanistan is “uniquely challenging.” One of the biggest impediments to oversight is limited mobility due to insurgent violence. The Project On Government Oversight has blogged about “oversight access bubbles” shrinking as U.S. and NATO troops withdraw and leave vast areas of the country unguarded. SIGAR estimates that no more than 21 percent of Afghanistan will be accessible to civilian oversight personnel by the end of 2014.
USAID and other international relief and development organizations must therefore develop alternative oversight methods. Last month, POGO expressed concerns about USAID’s plan, which outsources oversight to contractors. USAID continues to have contract oversight problems, which makes us worry about oversight of the overseers.
(This was always a problem in Iraq also. Their IG, the SIGIR, reported many abuses and lack of completion of projects. They had to hire local national contractors and make them take lots of pictures to actually see what the problems on a project were. Thus another reason to terminate foreign aid for reconstruction is when security is so bad you cannot get your own trusted observers to a work site. vj)
Lesson #4: A reconstruction effort must have clearly articulated goals and a sound way to measure progress toward those goals.
While it is widely acknowledged that strategic planning is a must, SIGAR has repeatedly found that such planning has been ignored throughout the reconstruction effort. For example, the U.S. has never articulated a clear anti-corruption strategy in Afghanistan. SIGAR also found that, even when nominal strategic plans exist, U.S.-government implementing agencies, including USAID, do not consistently articulate the goals they hope to achieve and the metrics they intend to use to assess whether those goals have been achieved. In short, the problem is that these agencies emphasize outputs over outcomes.
(When I was in Iraq, the reconstruction programs were run by civilian subject matter experts in IRMO, which was initially staffed via the DoD, then State. They were experts, not STATE department employees. In Afghanistan, all the leaders of reconstruction were STATE Dept. employees who had no clue about reconstruction, construction or anti-corruption practices. I was there in 2009 and because my anti-corruption training program kept finding corruption, their prime contractor shut it down. They were more interested in training consulting revenues than reporting corruption, and had no faith the State Dept. people would do anything to back them up. vj)
Finally, Special Inspector General Sopko’s written testimony notes that USAID needs to be “more forthright in providing complete information to both Congress and the American people about its reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.” This became a flashpoint at the hearing due to recent events. Earlier this week, USA Today reported that SIGAR had accused USAID of concealing from Congress information showing that the Afghan government is unable to prevent contracting with individuals and companies tied to insurgents and terrorist groups. At the hearing, Sampler took strong issue with the USA Today article, insisting it was false. Sopko stood by the accusation.
(State Dept. "weenies" avoid conflict and seem to always support the conflict country government, no matter what. Rather than have people who can be strong overseers to protect US investments in reconstruction, they hide information. From my experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. See more at my old blog on corruption at http://webworks.typepad.com/corruption_in_iraq ).
Judging from the highly charged questioning at the hearing, especially by Subcommittee Chairman Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) and Representative Peter Welch (D-VT), Congress is far from done on the issue of waste in Afghanistan reconstruction. Expect many more animated hearings in the near future.
Here it is 2013, and Afghanistan still is at the bottom of the list of most corrupt countries. Transparency International issues annual reports on 176 Countries ranked by perceived corruption.
So, Afghanistan is third from the bottom or third most corrupt country.
So the Afghan Anti-Corruption network has sent letters of complaint to Afghanistan leaders and US President Barack Obama (that should REALLY help) before an upcoming anti-corruption summit.
The Foundry, a blog run by The Heritage Foundation, published an article supporting SIGAR, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
They make the point that the new head of SIGAR, John F. Sopko, hit the ground running and published several audit reports since he started on Jyly 2, 2012.
In the past, some SIGAR heads' took over a year to get "up and running" and issue reports, so this is a great step.
Pictures of Iraq during my 23 months there and items related to anti-corruption. Most scenes are in the Green Zone plus a few convoy trips into the Baghdad area.
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